|
a catalyst for change through dialogue and understanding
|
AIC Update is funded entirely by tax-deductible donations. Please preserve this public service by contributing to the Council.
GIVE YOUR SUPPORT
|
"To Mehrangiz Kar in Recognition of Her Outstanding Contributions to Human and Women’s Rights in Iran"
Bush Administration provides incentives to European negotiations.
|
|
IN THIS ISSUE
The American Diplomatic Coup: A New Window of Opportunity for US-Iran Relations - Hooshang Amirahmadi
Read More
European Negotiations - An Update
Read More
US Intelligence on Iran’s Nuclear Program
Read More
The Opinion of the People: American Views on Iran
Read More
US-Iran Relations: A Business Perspective -
J. Michael Stinson
Read More
Please click on "Read More" or a "Photograph" to be taken to the appropriate story.
|
13th Annual Middle East Petroleum & Gas Conference
Gallup poll released on March 15, 2005 indicates that nearly two out of three (66%) Americans DO NOT support military action against Iran.
|
|
|
AIC Update is an information resource for US-Iran relations and the efforts of the American Iranian Council to promote dialogue and understanding between the United States and Iran.
|
(Pictured Above) AIC President and Director of Rutgers University Center for Middle Eastern Sutides, Hooshang Amirahmadi, presents Mehrangiz Kar (Iranian human rights activist) with plague reading "To Mehrangiz Kar in Recognition of Her Outstanding Contributions to Human and Women’s Rights in Iran. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Rutgers University"
(Pictured Right) The 13th Annual Middle East Petroleum & Gas Conference, to be held in conjunction with Middle East Petroleum & Gas Week (April 2-7, 2005) will feature two speakers connected with the American Iranian Council. Dr. Amirahmadi will be part of a panel on Geopolitics in the Middle East, and Dr. Fereidun Fesharaki, President of FACTS Inc. and a member of AIC’s Board of Directors, will issue a welcome as one of the Co-Chairmen of the conference and will provide commentary on the oil market.
|
|
|
The American Diplomatic Coup: A New Window
of Opportunity for US-Iran Relations
by
Hooshang Amirahmadi
|
The US has now joined the European Trio (England, France and Germany) in a new carrot-and-stick strategy that wants to convince Iran to halt uranium enrichment permanently in return for an economic incentive package that includes selling civilian airplane spare parts to Iran, and dropping US opposition to Iran’s quest for membership in the World Trade Organization. The flip side is that if Iran refuses the offer, the EU will cooperate with the US in reporting Iran to the UN Security Council for possible multilateral sanctions.
Why this sudden US change of heart, one might ask? The main reason, according to reliable sources, is that during their recent visits to Europe, President Bush and Secretary of State Rice convinced the European Trio that unless Iran’s uranium enrichment program completely and permanently stops, it would in due course build nuclear weapons. The Europeans, while accepting this argument, warned the US that such a demand would lead to the inevitable failure of their negotiations with Iran, which has insisted on its right to uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes.
Nonetheless, the Europeans agreed to change their position, from recognizing Iran’s right to uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes to the US position of not recognizing such a right for Iran, if the Bush administration joined the negotiations by supporting the Trio’s economic incentives for Iran. The Trio also accepted the US demand that if their carrot-based negotiations failed, they would join the administration to report Iran to the United Nations for a tougher stick-based approach.
The inherent inability of Europe to handle major international crises independent of the US led them to finally accept the American agenda for negotiations with Iran. It is this European dependence on the US that Iran has failed to appreciate, and which led Tehran to fruitless diplomacy with the EU Trio. The Bush administration has won a public diplomacy coup against Europe and Iran. Given the low price the US has offered, and Iran’s insistence on its right to maintain uranium enrichment, the negotiations are doomed to fail.
Such an outcome will serve the Bush administration in a number of ways. Europe will be forced to accept an American solution and Iran will find it impossible to refuse to deal with the US directly. Yet the most important immediate benefit to the US is in the area of public relations, the purpose for which the US supported the EU Trio in the first place. If it had not joined the negotiations and they failed, the blame would have gone to the US; now that the US has joined and offered “incentives,” the blame will fall on Iran.
The US needed to shift the blame on Iran to make it easier for it to report Tehran to the UN for multilateral sanctions and/or imposition of other options, including the use of force. President Bush has clearly expressed his administration’s public diplomacy ploy: “We are working with our friends to make sure not only the world hears that but that the negotiating strategy achieves the objective of pointing out where guilt needs to be, as well as achieving the objective of no nuclear weapons.” (New York Times, Thursday March 3, 2005).
|
Similarly, referring to the US-EU joint carrot-and-stick Iran strategy, Secretary of State Rice told Reuters on March 11 that “This is about unifying the international community so that it’s Iranians who are isolated, not the United States.” Meanwhile, and parallel to its public diplomacy, the US is making efforts to report Iran to the UN Security Council. Thus, when President Bush says “all options” remain open, he is not contemplating serious diplomacy, which requires direct dialogue and willingness to compromise. Good faith negotiating is the key to successful diplomacy.
Public diplomacy aside, forcing Iran into a strategic choice between permanently forgoing its rights to uranium enrichment and facing American rage is the ultimate purpose of the US strategy in joining the EU in its negotiations with Iran. Under this condition, Iran might decide to stop the negotiations and accuse the Trio of backing off from their original position, thus risking a showdown with the EU-US coalition in the UN. Alternatively, Iran might decide to accept the enrichment-for-incentive exchange, but only after more carrots are added to the package.
Iran will be well advised to take this latter road and use the indirect opening to the US to build confidence with Washington. Iran could be tempted to ask for a long list of incentives, including relief from American sanctions and removal from the list of states sponsoring terrorism. At this early stage, however, it will be a mistake for Iran to demand more than what the Americans are prepared to offer. The one thing that Iran must demand Americans do is to join the negotiations more directly, a demand that the Bush administration should welcome.
The window of opportunity that has been developed can be further opened if Iran and the US were to use the European channel to engage and then bypass that medium for a more direct dialogue. Ultimately, the deal over the Iranian uranium enrichment programs has the potential to make a large dent in the ice of US-Iran relations, leading to its gradual normalization. As the US experience with other dictatorships has shown in recent times, diplomatic ties are crucial for resolution of international problems and for the development of democratic institutions.
While Washington now has Iran on its toes to accept its proposed solution to Iran’s nuclear crisis, the balance could tip in favor of Iran if the opportunity is not used for further US-Iran engagement. Iran would win the public relations against the US if the Bush administration were to refuse Iran’s call for more direct talks. Iran could also walk out of the negotiations if its reasonable demands are ignored and the regime humiliated. Some hard-line conservatives have dubbed the Iranian pragmatic negotiators as traitors. On the nuclear issue, they have most Iranians on their side.
The Bush administration has threatened Tehran with multilateral sanctions and military attacks if Iran does not stop uranium enrichment. While such US actions would inflict significant costs on Iran and the Iranian people, they would not end the regime or halt its enrichment activities. On the contrary, they will further militarize the regime, strengthen its resolve to build a nuclear bomb, destroy what is left of the reform movement, and produce an anti-American backlash among a generally US-friendly population. The only realistic option is to use the opportunity that has developed to engage Iran toward normalization of relations.
|
|
Hooshang Amirahmadi is Professor and Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University and President of the American Iranian Council.
|
|
AIC has published and disseminated several important books, studies, and newsletters. These publications clearly demonstrate an objective, impartial, balanced and diverse approach. Please click on book to browse and purchase AIC publications. |
|
European Negotiations - An Update
AIC Update has been intimately following the nuclear negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran regarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology. Last week, the Council reported that US efforts to back incentives were an attempt to transfer the blame to Iran in the event of failed negotiations. The U.S.-EU-3 (Britain, Germany, and France), who initially differed on how to engage the Iranians, agreed to offer Iran economic incentives consisting of removal of impediments to World Trade Organization (WTO) admissions negotiations and lifting sanctions on the sale of spare parts for Iranian civilian aircraft. U.S. support for the European approach was offered in exchange for support of U.N.-imposed sanctions against Iran if negotiations fail. However, Iran has indicated that the incentives are “insignificant and hollow” and will not impede its right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. The ultimate failure of the negotiations hinges on whether any incentives are enough to force Iran to renege on its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Are these viable economic incentives offered to Iran? What incentives will persuade Iran to cooperate with U.S.-EU-3 demands?
Iran’s ailing economy is a real problem for the regime in Tehran, and many have suggested that it will respond or even reform in the face of economic incentives. However, admission to the WTO is a long process and will not satisfy the immediate needs of the regime. Whether any amount of incentives will convince the regime to give up its right to nuclear technology is unclear. However, more robust economic incentives must include rendering financial assistance to modernize the National Iranian Oil Company’s “dilapidated infrastructure,” resolving the issue of the Shah’s frozen assets, and (at least) a partial lift of current economic sanctions that have isolated Iran from the global economy by prohibiting foreign international companies from doing business with Iran.
Should Iran be prohibited from uranium enrichment while other signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are permitted to produce nuclear fuel?
Iran is permitted under the NPT to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, the NPT does not contain a failsafe for governments that convert their civilian nuclear program into one for military purposes and renounce their treaty obligations. In recent days many Iranian officials have converged around the notion that Iran has the right to pursue peaceful technology and will adopt the protocols and environment necessary to prove that the nuclear program is peaceful. President Mohammad Khatami, speaking in Isfahan, Iran, where members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries are meeting, rejected calls from the U.S. and European Union to end the enrichment, calling them ‘unacceptable’. However, considering Iran’s earlier concealment of activities, they have a responsibility to provide greater transparency to promote international confidence.
|
US Intelligence on Iran’s Nuclear Programs
In the aftermath of the Iraq war, US intelligence on weapons of mass destruction was proven a failure, if not downright fabricated. What is even more disturbing about those “intelligence failures” is that they were concocted to legitimize a planned war. These fabrications misled or misinformed government officials, who in turn misled or misinformed the entire international community. We should be wary of repeating these events with Iran.
Some in the intelligence community, political circles, and the media have blamed Iraqi exile opposition for providing the wrong information. To justify such a gross neglect, if not mischief, by placing the blame on the exile opposition is even more sinful. Why were they listening to an exile opposition that they knew had a selfish agenda, but not to the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to tens of governments, hundreds of NGOs, and thousands of respected individuals, including Americans?
Equally disturbing is the fact that the US media has learned very little from that scandal, which it actively helped to promote. The New York Times published a self-critical review of its reporting, but only after it was too late for the public to learn the truth. Unfortunately, this same media is repeating their mistakes with respect to Iran. They report, with exaggerations, what the Iranian exile opposition and certain intelligence communities report, again ignoring many, including the IAEA, which says it has found no evidence of nuclear weapons programs in Iran.
Iran’s dishonesty in facing up to its nuclear debacle has provided questionable intelligence sources with a powerful pretext to expose, not just Iran’s programs, but its assumed intentions to develop nuclear weapons. Iran defends its policy of concealing enrichment facilities and activities on the United States. According to Dr. Javad Zarif, Iran’s Ambassador to the UN, it was the American efforts to prevent Iran from exercising its rights to acquire the knowledge, technology and raw materials necessary to enrich uranium for peaceful nuclear energy purposes that made Iran decide to go underground.
Notwithstanding the Ambassador’s claim, nothing can justify Iran’s underhanded nuclear behavior, just as nothing can justify the deceptive reporting on Iran’s nuclear program and intentions. In this dangerous time and situation, the two sides must uphold facts and truth and nothing but facts and truth. Lies and fiction are contrary to the national interests of the two nations. Iran must deal with the suspicion caused by its own lies by becoming fully transparent and cooperative with the IAEA, the Europeans, and with the Americans in particular.
The Bush administration should also make every effort, and take every measure, to make sure that its intelligence on Iran’s nuclear activities is as accurate as possible. Even if the administration were to have a war plan ready for Iran (which we hope is not the case), it still needs to be truthful about its intelligence on Iran’s nuclear programs and intentions. Otherwise, we will be repeating the same saga that followed the war against Iraq. At stake is American international credibility and prestige.
It is comforting to learn that the Bush administration is addressing Iran’s intelligence matter with due attention to process and contents. As was reported by the New York Times on March 9, 2005, the President had already established a bipartisan commission to reassess American intelligence on Iran’s nuclear programs. The commission’s report, due to be released by March 31, finds “American intelligence on Iran is inadequate to allow firm judgments about Iran's weapons programs.”
The Times reports that “in interviews, people who have been briefed on the commission's deliberations and conclusions said they regarded the record on Iran as particularly worrisome… One person who described the panel's deliberations and conclusions characterized American intelligence on Iran as "scandalous," given the importance and relative openness of the country…” Yet, and again according to the Times, an unclassified report sent to Congress in last November by CIA director Porter J. Goss, , had indicated that Iran continues "to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons."
The new bipartisan commission report arrives as American intelligence agencies prepare a revised National Intelligence Estimate on Iran based on the one released in 2001. The new formal assessment will include both Iran’s nuclear programs and its political stability. A better understanding of Iran’s political stability is the key to a more realistic American policy toward Tehran. However, the exile opposition has been less than truthful on the stability of the regime in Tehran: for several years, they have been telling the American people and administrations that the regime was about to implode, and continue to reassert their discredited implosion theory.
The Times also reports that in Congress, the Senate Intelligence Committee is also undertaking “its own review into the quality of intelligence on Iran, in what the Republican and Democratic leaders of the panel have described as an effort to pre-empt any repeat of the experience in Iraq, where prewar American assertions about illicit weapons proved to be mistaken.” This is still more good news. Let us be hopeful that these reports will make the correct assessment and help the Bush administration formulate the right Iran policy, which has been due for some time now.
|
The Opinion of the People: American Views on Iran
In the three years since September 11, the American public has radically changed its position regarding US military action against Iran. Despite talk that the Administration intends to attack Iran, a recent poll by Gallup has indicated that the American public simply does not support such a course of action. The poll released on March 15, 2005 indicates that nearly two out of three (66%) Americans DO NOT support military action against Iran and only 28% of Americans said they would support taking military action against Iran. This poll stands in stark contrast to a similar one taken a few months after the September 11 terrorist attack and following President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. The poll taken in early 2002 indicated that 7 out of 10 (71%) Americans would support action against Iran. Iran, along with Syria and North Korea, continues to have very low favorability ratings among Americans, and the reversal of sentiments is indicative of the growing dissatisfaction with the US military interventionism.
|
Please help us to continue our peacemaking endeavors by contributing to our mission. The American Iranian Council depends on the support of its members and readers in order to improve understanding and dialogue between the nations and peoples of the United States and Iran. |
|
Considering the state of affairs and the renewed interest of the current Administration to use economic incentives in US-Iran relations, it is important to consider the perspective of those intimately involved in the nation’s trade and commerce. The following speech was presented at an American Iranian Council conference on December 17, 2001. The following has been published in the book US-Iran Relations in the Shadow of September 11: Bridging the Great Divide. At this conference, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright revisited her historic speech of March 2000, linking the hopeful words of that occasion to the new possibilities for US-Iran relations which were born out of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. This publication can be purchased on the American Iranian Council website.
US-Iran Relations: A Business Perspective
J. Michael Stinson
Our company has invested in Iran, or attempted to invest in Iran, for over forty years, with an increased interest during the 1990s and in the current decade. Because we're a commercial company, we tend to favor action. We attempt to find an opportunity, a trustworthy government, or a trustworthy partner in another country, in order to make a deal that by definition has to be good for both parties. The process of doing that is technical, legal, and commercial.
If we can establish a relationship that we can count on, then we have the foundation of something that can last in the commercial arena for a very long time. I would submit that when trade and development start to flourish, when people get to know each other, when money is at risk on both sides, where two cultures are interacting, then there is a very real possibility of also making progress along political lines.
We found that in Iran. We found it in the regime of the Shah. We found it in the early regime of Khomeini, but we have particularly found it in the last few years. The Iranians are the toughest negotiators around. They have been tough negotiators for thousands of years. But they honor what they sign.
Are they perfect? No, they are not, and neither are we, but these are people that we have come to trust. How do we know that? Well, the contract that we signed in 1995, after the U.S. government’s unilateral economic sanctions and the ILSA legislation, was taken over by a very competent French oil company. The National Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian government honored their end of the contract. We know that because we interact with both the French oil company and the National Iranian Oil Company, so we know that the contract which we wrote was in fact honored.
In 1999, another opportunity was presented to us, and that was the Haza-D'Ghan, probably one of the largest fields to be discovered in the last 30 or 40 years. Because of the trustworthy relationship that we as a company had established with the National Iranian Oil Company, they first came to us despite the fact that they knew that we would have difficulties, if not be prevented, by existing Executive Order sanctions from actually cooperating with them. In terms of caviar, pistachios, and Persian carpets, there were some gestures made as well. I think that by and large the Iranians did appreciate that.
We have just been talking. The words have been passing each other in large measure. Frankly, I think because of the leadership position of the United States it is up to the United States to make some changes, take some risk, do some innovative things that can push forward the possibility of having a government-to-government relationship.
I agree that Iran may not actually want to take that risk, but I think it is up to us to be big enough to say that we will drop some of these sanctions, some of these restrictions, in order to make a very large public gesture that will not be mistaken and will not be drowned out as being too small to be heard.
These things do take time. I was deeply impressed by a book called Man Without a Gun, written by Giandomenico Picco. It is an exceptional account of individual dedication to bringing balance, and bringing understanding, and bringing tremendously disparate forces together to seek a resolution to problems of an international scale – the Iran-Iraq war on the one hand, and the captured Lebanese hostages on the other.
It is an example of taking action year after year, and becoming a trustworthy partner in these things. In that case, thank God it worked, and it can work in some of these other things. I wish our government would read the book, and I say that there are some things that we can do to start the process of establishing a relationship with one of the most important countries in the world, and in a very volatile region.
There are a tremendous number of things that we could do in the way of trade, expanding on the medicinal and food goods that we can trade with Iran today. We need to tell the government that it is insulting for known people to be fingerprinted when they enter the United States. They don't do it to us, but we do it to them. It is one of those small signals that needs to be dropped right now.
We need to consider at least the possibility of identifying and setting up some kind of commission to establish what are the assets of Iran frozen in the United States, so that as one powerful gesture we could start the process of returning those assets to the Iranians.
Many of you are members of the Iranian diaspora. I think it is tremendously important for you to do two things. First, do your part to have a dialogue with the currently sitting Iranian government, whether you agree with them or not. And then make your positions known to our own government. Do it in a dedicated way. Take some action.
J. Michael Stinson is a Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Corporate Strategy and Communications for Conoco, Inc. Mr. Stinson joined Conoco in 1965 and has filled a number of assignments in operations and management in the United States, Europe and the Asia Pacific region. He was Vice President of Business Development and Resources for Conoco’s worldwide exploration and production activities as well as Vice President of Global Business Development. Mr. Stinson is a fellow of the Institute of Petroleum and is the past chairman of the American Heart Association’s Houston division.
|
Vision
The vision of the American Iranian Council is that the United States and Iran will work together, since their common interests far outweigh their differences. AIC also envisions the Iranian-American community playing an increasingly significant role in American society, and Iran becoming a democratically developed member of the global community with full respect for human rights.
|
Mission
The mission of AIC is to be a constructive force, in cooperation and partnership with other organizations, in bringing the United States and Iran together, involving the Iranian-American community in the dialogue, and bringing attention to social and political conditions in Iran.
|
Goals
The three interrelated goals of the American Iranian Council are:
1.
To serve as a platform for sustained dialogue on U.S.-Iran relations.
2. To serve as a catalyst to educate all Americans, including Iranian-Americans, regarding this dialogue.
3. To serve as a forum for discussion of issues of importance in Iranian society.
|
|
|
